Its central idea is that, as candidate countries implement reforms and make verified progress in specific sectors, they should be able to gradually experience some of the benefits associated with EU membership before full accession.

This approach is not presented as an alternative to full membership. Rather, it seeks to make the integration process more credible and predictable by linking concrete progress to tangible benefits along the way.

Presenting the Charter, Mattiolo placed Western Balkan integration within a broader international context. In an increasingly fragmented and polarised world, he argued, completing Europe’s integration, including the Western Balkans, has become a strategic interest for the continent.

Italy and Montenegro in Dialogue on Western Balkan Integration

The proposal became part of the institutional discussion during the Interactive Dialogue “Accelerating Western Balkans Integration as a Strategic Choice for Europe’s Future”, moderated by Ambassador Luigi Mattiolo, with the participation of Antonio Tajani, Vice President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Italy, and Ervin Ibrahimović, Deputy Prime Minister for International Relations and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro.

Ibrahimović highlighted Montenegro’s commitment to its European path and the importance of a merit-based approach, linking progress towards membership to reforms and continued cooperation with European partners. He reiterated Montenegro’s ambition to complete negotiations by 2026 and work towards EU membership in 2028.

Tajani called for a change in the way the process itself is described. Rather than speaking only of EU “enlargement”, he proposed the concept of European “reunification”, stressing that the Western Balkan countries are European countries and that their integration is part of completing the European project.

At the same time, he emphasised that rigorous procedures should not become an obstacle to political progress and argued that the process should not be weakened by excessive bureaucracy or continued delays.

Towards the end of the dialogue, the discussion returned directly to the proposal presented by the SEE Observatory. Tajani expressed appreciation for the Observatory’s contribution and for the idea of a less bureaucratic model of integration, expressing support for an approach capable of providing candidate countries with concrete benefits as they make verified progress towards membership.

The exchange gave the SEE Observatory Charter a direct place within the wider political discussion of the Forum.

Security, economy and connectivity

Security was closely linked to the discussion. Ibrahimović stressed that the security of the Western Balkans and the security of Europe are closely interconnected, while Tajani placed the region within the wider debate on European security and defence.

The dialogue also explored the economic dimension of integration.

Ibrahimović highlighted the relationship between Montenegro and Italy and pointed to energy, renewable sources, education, research, entrepreneurship and investment as areas where closer cooperation can already generate concrete opportunities. The electricity interconnection between Italy and Montenegro was also recalled as an example of existing links between the two countries.

Tajani similarly connected Western Balkan integration with the creation of a larger and stronger European market, highlighting the opportunities that closer economic integration could create for trade, investment, tourism and the movement of people.

Connectivity was another important element of the discussion. The strategic position of Trieste and the Upper Adriatic, together with links towards the Western Balkans and Central Europe, was considered within the broader development of international transport and trade corridors.

Across the discussion, integration therefore emerged not only as an institutional process, but as one that also develops through economic relations, energy, infrastructure and direct connections between countries and people.

With the presentation of the Charter, the SEE Observatory brought its proposal into this wider institutional debate: linking verified progress towards EU membership with tangible benefits along the way, while maintaining full accession as the final objective.

L'articolo Progressive benefits on the path to EU Membership: the SEE Observatory proposal for the Western Balkans proviene da South East Europe Observatory.

This question was at the heart of the first SEE Observatory Annual Forum, held on 15 September at the Ridotto del Teatro Verdi in Trieste under the title “Accelerating Western Balkans Integration as a Strategic Choice for Europe’s Future.”

The Forum brought together institutional representatives, policymakers, diplomats and younger generations for a discussion that went beyond the accession process itself, addressing the political, security and economic dimensions of Western Balkan integration and its significance for Europe’s future.

The Annual Forum also brought to Trieste the different strands of the SEE Observatory’s work developed throughout 2026. The Liberal Dialogues had taken the debate on Europe’s future across the region, while the SEE Youth Forum, held the previous day at MIB Trieste School of Management, created a space for younger generations to identify shared priorities and develop proposals for future initiatives.

Western Balkan Integration as a European Priority

Opening the Forum, Andrea Cangini, Director of the SEE Observatory and Secretary General of the Luigi Einaudi Foundation, reflected on the purpose behind the Observatory and the work developed during its first year. He recalled the role of the Liberal Dialogues in bringing together hundreds of young people, academics and representatives from across the region, placing the promotion of the European ideal and liberal thought among younger generations at the centre of the Observatory’s mission. For Cangini, accelerating the integration of the Western Balkans represents both a political and strategic imperative for Europe.

The relationship between Trieste, Friuli Venezia Giulia and South-East Europe also emerged strongly during the institutional opening.

Massimiliano Fedriga, President of the Autonomous Region of Friuli Venezia Giulia, described the region – and Trieste in particular – not simply as a bridge towards the Balkans, but as “the bridge of the Balkans towards Europe.” His intervention highlighted the role of people, infrastructure and economic connections in turning institutional integration into a concrete process.

Vladimir Nanut, Founder and CEO of MIB Trieste School of Management and Board Member of the SEE Observatory, recalled the School’s long-standing international vocation and its relationship with Central and Eastern Europe, stressing the importance of combining European values with the skills needed to prepare future generations of leaders.

Franco Dal Mas, Secretary General of the Central European Initiative, also framed the process as one of European reunification rather than simply enlargement, placing younger generations at the centre of this perspective: “Young people are not tomorrow, they are today, and it is today that we build Europe.”

Bringing Young Voices into the Annual Forum

Younger generations also had a direct role in the programme. During the round table “Our Idea of Europe: Young People’s Proposals”, moderated by Eva Ciuk, Scientific Director and Coordinator of the SEE Observatory Scientific Committee, the five winners of the SEE Observatory scholarships shared their vision of Europe and presented their perspectives to the institutional representatives attending the Forum.

Their participation created a direct connection with the SEE Youth Forum held the previous day, where young people and professors representing the countries within the SEE Observatory’s area of interest, alongside a delegation from UWC Adriatic, had worked together to identify priorities, proposals and project ideas for the future of Europe and regional cooperation.

The round table was followed by the Scholarship Award Ceremony, during which the five SEE Observatory scholarships were presented, together with the annual scholarship for the MBA in International Business at MIB Trieste School of Management.

From the First Annual Forum to the Next Phase

A central moment of the Forum was the institutional dialogue moderated by Ambassador Luigi Mattiolo, Honorary President of the SEE Observatory, with Antonio Tajani, Vice President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Italy, and Ervin Ibrahimović, Deputy Prime Minister for International Relations and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro. The Forum also provided an opportunity for the SEE Observatory to present a concrete proposal – the SEE Observatory Charter – aimed at making Western Balkan integration more tangible and credible.

The first SEE Observatory Annual Forum thus brought together the different dimensions of the Observatory’s work in 2026: the regional dialogue developed through the Liberal Dialogues, the involvement of younger generations through the SEE Youth Forum, and the institutional debate on the future integration of the Western Balkans. The ideas and proposals developed throughout this journey now provide a basis for the Observatory’s future activities and for the next edition of the Liberal Dialogues, continuing the conversation across Central and South-East Europe.

Read more about the SEE Observatory Charter and the institutional dialogue on Western Balkan integration in our dedicated article.

L'articolo The SEE Observatory Annual Forum: accelerate Western Balkans Integration as a Strategic Choice for Europe’s Future proviene da South East Europe Observatory.

These questions were at the heart of the SEE Youth Forum 2026, held on 14 September at MIB Trieste School of Management. Promoted by the SEE Observatory, the Forum brought together young people from across the region, alongside professors and experts, for a participatory workshop focused on some of Europe’s key challenges: democratic participation, dialogue, peace and security, sustainability, freedom of expression and regional cooperation.

Rather than being simply a space for discussion, the Youth Forum was conceived as a laboratory of ideas. Guided by Irena Topalli, an expert in civil society and youth policies, participants worked in groups, comparing experiences and perspectives from their respective countries to identify shared priorities and develop proposals for the future of Europe and regional cooperation. Their contributions will help shape the themes and activities of the Liberal Dialogues 2027.

The Forum brought together participants from Italy and from all the countries within the SEE Observatory’s area of interest, alongside a delegation of students from UWC Adriatic, creating a genuinely regional space for exchange between different experiences and perspectives.

Among the participants were the five winners of the SEE Observatory international call “How to Build the Europe I Would Like”: Draga Gajić from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Tea Radunović from Montenegro, Algert Bici from Albania, Marina Cossu from Italy and Jana Djudjic from Serbia.

The Youth Forum was not an isolated event. The ideas developed on 14 September were brought into the institutional conversation the following day, when the SEE Observatory Annual Forum gathered young people, policymakers and institutional representatives at Trieste’s Ridotto del Teatro Verdi. There, the five young participants received their €1,000 scholarships and shared their reflections on Europe in the context of a high-level discussion attended by, among others, Antonio Tajani, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Italy, and Ervin Ibrahimović, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro.

Watch the full SEE Observatory Annual Forum here!

Five Voices, One European Conversation

Different backgrounds and perspectives converged around common priorities: peace, trust, participation and the need to make young people active contributors to the European project.

For Draga Gajić, who recalled growing up in Banja Luka and reflected on the impact of war on her family history, peace cannot be taken for granted. “We all need to work on peace and build peace, because peace is not given,” she said. Dialogue, tolerance and individual responsibility are therefore essential, particularly at a time when democracy and liberal values are facing growing pressure. After meeting and working with the young participants in Trieste, her conclusion was one of confidence: “Europe is in good hands.”

Tea Radunović invited the audience to imagine Europe “through children’s eyes”: a Europe capable of preserving dreams and hopes, but also of questioning what is wrong rather than simply accepting it. “Why does it have to be this way?” she asked, calling for a Europe that pays greater attention to people, opportunities and future generations.

For Algert Bici, Europe should be more than a union of countries. It should be a community where young people can have equal opportunities regardless of where they come from, built on solidarity, cooperation and respect, and able to combine innovation with democracy.

The value of dialogue emerged strongly from Marina Cossu’s experience. Meeting young people from the Western Balkans and hearing how they look at the European Union with hope changed her own perspective. The exchange showed how bringing together people with different experiences can challenge assumptions and strengthen a shared sense of European belonging.

Jana Djudjic focused on another crucial issue: the distance between young people and institutions. Her call was to bring younger generations “into the heart of institutions”, creating spaces where they can understand European processes, participate and recognise the value of their contribution. Her final message captured the spirit of the discussion: “Never forget that your voice is our Europe.”

From Trieste to the Liberal Dialogues 2027

From the collaborative work of the Youth Forum to the stage of the Annual Forum, the two days in Trieste offered a common message: Europe’s future cannot be discussed without the generations that will live it.

For the SEE Observatory, their ideas are not intended to remain within the Forum. They will become part of the work leading towards the Liberal Dialogues 2027, continuing a process designed to turn dialogue between young Europeans into participation, cooperation and concrete proposals for the future of the continent.

L'articolo Building Europe Together: The Voices of a New Generation from the SEE Youth and Annual Forums proviene da South East Europe Observatory.

There is an abandoned agricultural warehouse in Kravica, a few kilometres from Srebrenica. There is no memorial plaque outside, nothing to tell a visitor that on 13 and 14 July 1995, between 1,000 and more than 1,300 Bosniak men and boys were killed inside and around this former agricultural cooperative.

The massacre was one of the first mass executions following the fall of Srebrenica and formed part of the genocide in which more than 8,000 Bosniak men and boys were killed. The forces responsible were under the command of General Ratko Mladić. Mladić died on 27 August at the age of 84 in the prison hospital in The Hague, where he was serving a life sentence. In 2021, his conviction for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes became final. His death should have closed one of the darkest chapters of the wars that accompanied the breakup of Yugoslavia. Instead, it demonstrated how politically alive that past remains.

In Serbia and Republika Srpska, politicians, nationalist organisations and parts of the public mourned Mladić as a hero. Memorial gatherings were organised in several cities, while graffiti and banners celebrating him appeared once again in public spaces. Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić criticised the UN International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals for refusing previous requests to release Mladić on health grounds. Serbia also announced that, as a former general, Mladić would be buried with military and state honours. The controversy goes far beyond the funeral of one man.

More than thirty years after the Bosnian war, the case of Ratko Mladić exposes the continuing gap between judicial truth and political memory in the Western Balkans. International courts have established the facts of Srebrenica and Mladić’s responsibility. Yet court verdicts alone have not created a common understanding of the past. This unresolved legacy is particularly important for Serbia, a country that formally remains committed to joining the European Union.

European integration is usually discussed through negotiating chapters, economic reforms, rule-of-law benchmarks and institutional changes. But becoming part of the European political community is also about democratic culture: the ability of institutions and societies to confront established facts, recognise victims and reject the political glorification of those convicted of the gravest crimes. This is where Serbia continues to face a profound contradiction.

Its governments have maintained EU membership as a strategic objective while nationalist narratives about the wars of the 1990s continue to occupy an important place in public life. Rather than disappearing with time, those narratives can be reactivated whenever they become politically useful. Mladić’s death offered another example.

By shifting attention from the crimes for which he was convicted to his treatment by the Hague tribunal, political discourse can transform a convicted war criminal into a victim and Serbia itself into the victim of an allegedly hostile international order. This narrative is not new. For decades, it has helped turn questions of individual criminal responsibility into questions of collective national grievance.

Perhaps more worrying is that the debate is no longer confined to the generation that lived through the wars. Serbia’s young people are divided as well. The student protest movement that has challenged Vučić’s system of power includes many young people demanding accountability, stronger institutions and a more democratic country. Yet nationalist currents are also visible among the younger generation. Following Mladić’s death, some students publicly mourned him, while a large banner displayed on Belgrade’s Branko Bridge declared: “Our freedom lives through your struggle.” Many of those taking part in this debate were not even born when the Bosnian war ended. That is why the politics of memory matters for Serbia’s future. If younger generations inherit the same unresolved narratives, historical revisionism ceases to be simply a legacy of the past. It becomes part of the political culture of the future.

This also presents a challenge for the European Union. The EU has renewed its attention to enlargement, and the Western Balkans have once again become strategically important in a Europe transformed by war in Ukraine and geopolitical competition. Serbia remains essential to the stability and European future of the region. But enlargement cannot be reduced to geopolitical necessity.

A European future for the Western Balkans also requires democratic resilience, functioning institutions, regional cooperation and genuine reconciliation. None of these is easily compatible with the continued public glorification of individuals convicted of genocide and crimes against humanity. Ratko Mladić’s death therefore leaves Serbia with a question that is larger than Mladić himself.

The issue is not whether Serbian society must accept a single interpretation of every aspect of the Yugoslav wars. Democratic societies inevitably debate their history. But such debate must begin with established facts and with a clear distinction between historical discussion and the glorification of crimes. Serbia’s European path will ultimately depend not only on what laws it adopts or negotiating chapters it closes, but also on what kind of political culture it chooses to build.

More than thirty years after Srebrenica, the past is still capable of returning to Serbia’s streets, dividing a new generation and becoming an instrument of contemporary politics.

Ratko Mladić is dead. The more difficult question is whether the political culture that turned him into a hero can finally be left behind.

Further reading

Valigia Blu — Il boia di Srebrenica è morto, la sua mostruosa ideologia si aggira ancora per l’Europa

Osservatorio Balcani Caucaso Transeuropa — Mladić è morto, ma non la sua ideologia

L'articolo After Mladić: Serbia’s Unfinished Reckoning with the Past proviene da South East Europe Observatory.

The outcome of the Icelandic referendum – with 52.8% of voters rejecting the resumption of European Union accession negotiations—does not represent a mere episode of Nordic folklore, nor a technical dispute over the exploitation of fishing quotas in the North Atlantic. Rather, it constitutes a political-constitutional earthquake of systemic magnitude, capable of exposing the obsolescence of international constraints in the contemporary multipolar context. The vote in Reykjavik certifies an inconvenient truth that European chancelleries prefer to ignore: membership in the European Union is no longer perceived as an inevitable and unavoidable historical destiny, but rather as a bureaucratic and regulatory cost that certain peripheral partners deliberately choose not to bear.

The decision of the small Arctic Republic must be interpreted as an exercise of cold, calculating functional realism, matured in a global environment where security has been structurally decoupled from political integration. Iceland conducted an extreme pragmatic cost-benefit analysis: its military deterrence and the physical protection of its territory are already fully guaranteed by the Atlantic Alliance, while access to the single market is secured through its participation in the European Economic Area. Within such a framework, ceding significant portions of national sovereignty and decision-making autonomy to Brussels to obtain a marginal “plus” compared to the status quo was deemed a disadvantageous bargain. The classic “European package” – which inextricably links legislative harmonization, market access, and political conditionality – has been unbundled and rejected.

This conceptual short-circuit carries disruptive implications for the European Union’s action in its southern quadrant, exposing the structural fragilities of the enlargement process toward the Western Balkans. For over two decades, Brussels has managed its geographical neighbourhood through a purely technical-bureaucratic approach, treating accession as an endless maturity exam. The ritual has remained identical and static: thirty-five negotiating chapters to open and close, a dense constellation of technical and judicial benchmarks to tick off, annual assessments conducted by a Commission perceived as a cold and distant judge, and finally, a verdict demanding the political unanimity of the EU-27. This practice has been founded on an unshakable, fideistic conviction: the idea that the intrinsic attractiveness of the EU model and the transformative power of its rules were self-sufficient magnetic forces, capable on their own of inducing democratic convergence and lasting reforms.

The contrast between Iceland and the Balkan peninsula reveals the trap of this framework. While the Arctic island can afford the luxury of refusal due to its democratic stability and geostrategic position, the countries of the Western Balkans are fragile, exposed realities contiguous to the European Union. Yet, the political elites of the Region have drawn the exact same conclusion as Icelandic voters: formal accession to Brussels is no longer the only game in town. Rather than accelerating along the path of reforms, opportunistic and illiberal leaderships have understood how to politically monetise a state of permanent transition, transforming it into a lucrative geopolitical rent. Exploiting European procedural delays as an alibi, these ruling classes play simultaneously at multiple tables within a highly competitive alliance market. They negotiate opaque infrastructural investments with China, tolerate Russian interference and energy blackmail, open security channels with Turkey, and forge informal axes of cooperation with Trump-aligned conservative networks. They cash in on immediate resources without having to submit to any democratic or rule-of-law conditionalities.

The Union’s failure lies in its obstinacy in defending the Monnet Method, a model designed for an era of slow, linear, and predictable peace – for a world in which cohesion could gradually radiate from the bureaucratic center toward the periphery. Today, history is running in the opposite direction. Faced with asymmetric threats and Russia’s hybrid warfare, it is the periphery that behaves as the true Europe, while the decision-making center remains paralysed by its own political hesitations and opportunistic vetoes. Ukraine proves this: on the battlefield, its army has fused heterogeneous Western military technologies into a single digital defense system, becoming the operational vanguard of a common European defense that Brussels has yet to even theorise.

The unspoken truth hovering in the corridors of the Berlaymont is that the Union’s current, fragile stability rests not on integration, but on calculated, strategic exclusion. Keeping the Western Balkans locked in an eternal waiting room has become the daily institutional sedative for Brussels. This permanent buffer zone serves a weak Europe by allowing it to offload its own crises – starting with Italian migration policies and the failed centers of Shengjin and Gjadër in Albania – without granting these countries a seat in the Council, which would alter internal political balances and force a reform of the unanimity rule. The acquis communautaire no longer acts as an ideal horizon, but as a mental bunker erected to defend a sclerotic status quo.

The consequences of this political vacuum are evident and dangerous. To avert the collapse of its own security, the European Union must abandon the binary logic of all-or-nothing and adopt the posture of a geopolitical power. Today, the Eastern frontier stretching from Tirana to Kyiv represents the new limes of the West. If Brussels continues to take refuge in the swamp of its own regulations, someone else will write the rules of continental security in its place. To avoid condemning itself to sclerosis, Europe must have the courage to transform its bureaucracy into politics, offering real protection and safeguards today, lest it be subjected to the force of tomorrow’s autocrats.

The original article in Italian by Gianluca Eramo was published on Linkiesta at the following link: www.linkiesta.it

L'articolo Lessons from Iceland: Europe Can No Longer Take Accession for Granted, Not Even in the Balkans proviene da South East Europe Observatory.

“2026 is a decisive year.” With these words, Italy’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Antonio Tajani reaffirmed his government’s commitment to the European integration of the Western Balkans during the launch of Italy’s Presidency of the EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region (EUSAIR).

Describing the reunification of the Western Balkans with the European Union as “the greatest strategic investment Europe can make,” Tajani also reiterated that enlargement remains “an absolute strategic priority” for both the Italian Government and Italian foreign policy. His remarks presented enlargement not simply as a political objective, but as part of a broader strategy centred on regional cooperation, connectivity and economic development.

Italy’s vision for the Adriatic-Ionian region

As Italy takes over the Presidency of EUSAIR for the next twelve months, Rome intends to strengthen cooperation between European institutions, national governments, regional authorities and civil society.

Established by the European Union in 2014, EUSAIR is the EU’s macro-regional strategy for the Adriatic-Ionian area. It brings together four EU Member States—Croatia, Greece, Italy and Slovenia—alongside San Marino and five EU candidate countries—Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia—to promote cooperation in areas including transport, energy, environmental sustainability and economic development.

As Tajani stated, the goal is to make the Adriatic-Ionian area “an increasingly dynamic driver of growth and a key economic, logistical and energy hub between Europe and the wider Mediterranean.”

Why connectivity is central to enlargement

One of the strongest messages of Tajani’s speech concerned infrastructure. He described European transport corridors as “tools for economic and political integration,” highlighting their role in improving trade flows, strengthening supply chains and bringing the Western Balkans closer to the European Union.

Among the projects mentioned was Corridor VIII, part of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T), which connects the Adriatic Sea with the Black Sea through Albania, North Macedonia and Bulgaria. Tajani also highlighted the importance of Corridor X, another major European transport route linking Central Europe with Croatia, Serbia, North Macedonia and Greece. Together, these corridors are designed to facilitate the movement of people and goods while supporting regional economic integration.

Italy also reiterated its support for the proposed Trieste–Ljubljana–Zagreb–Belgrade railway, presented as part of its broader vision to strengthen regional connectivity, and for the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), the international connectivity initiative aimed at strengthening trade links between Europe, the Middle East and Asia. Within this framework, Tajani underlined the strategic role that Trieste and the Northern Adriatic port system could play as gateways connecting European and global markets.

Enlargement remains a strategic priority

Later the same day, speaking before Parliament, Tajani reiterated Italy’s support for Ukraine’s future accession to the European Union while stressing that the Western Balkans should not lose momentum in the enlargement process.

He also identified Montenegro and Albania as the countries currently making the most advanced progress towards EU membership, reaffirming Italy’s commitment to supporting their accession path.

Whether 2026 ultimately becomes a turning point will depend on the pace of reforms in candidate countries and on the political will of EU Member States. For now, however, Italy has clearly placed enlargement back at the heart of its European agenda, supported by stronger regional cooperation, improved connectivity and long-term strategic investment.

Sources

• Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Italy, Ministers Tajani and Foti launch Italy’s Presidency of the EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region (EUSAIR), 28 July 2026.
• ANSA, “Tajani: 2026 will be a decisive year for the strategy on the Balkans”, 28 July 2026.

L'articolo Why 2026 Could Be a Decisive Year for EU Enlargement proviene da South East Europe Observatory.

Importance of EU integration

For my generation, European integration is no longer simply a foreign policy objective. It is a question of what kind of future we want to live in. We are growing up in a world shaped by geopolitical instability, economic uncertainty, disinformation, and increasing political fragmentation. At a time when even the largest states struggle to face global challenges alone, I believe the answer cannot be less Europe, but more Europe. Only through cooperation, solidarity, and deeper integration can European countries remain secure, competitive, and capable of protecting the democratic values on which they are built.

This is precisely why I see Montenegro’s future exclusively within the European Union. I genuinely believe there is no credible alternative. For Montenegrins, European integration represents far more than membership in an international organization. It means stronger democratic institutions, an independent judiciary, greater economic and social security, and opportunities that a small country could hardly create on its own. My hope is that, in the next decade or two, Montenegro will become a modern European democracy where institutions are stronger than individuals, where the law applies equally to everyone, and where young people feel they can build their future without having to leave their country behind.

Future of Montenegro as MS

At the same time, I think it is important to remain realistic. EU membership is not a magic solution that will erase decades of political polarization, weak institutions, brain drain, or the spread of disinformation overnight. Accession is the beginning of a much longer process rather than its conclusion. The responsibility to reform Montenegro will always remain primarily ours. Yet the European Union provides the framework, the expertise, and the partnership that make those reforms possible. With the support and experience of the other Member States, Montenegro will have the best opportunity to become a stronger, more resilient modern democratic country.

Of course, European integration also brings challenges. Previous enlargements have shown that freedom of movement often encourages young people to seek opportunities abroad. Montenegro should expect this as well. However, I see this not as a reason to question accession, but as a reminder that our work does not end when membership begins. Our political leaders must already be creating conditions that will encourage talented young people to return by investing in quality jobs, competitive salaries, and strong public institutions, particularly in sectors facing severe shortages such as healthcare and the judiciary.

When I think about the Europe my generation should build, I imagine a politically stronger and more integrated Union that speaks with confidence, protects its democratic values, and offers every European country, regardless of its size, an equal place around the table. I hope that one day I will be able to tell future generations: “we moved Europe forward; now it is your turn to continue.” I believe young people in Montenegro are ready for that responsibility. We do not simply want to join the European Union. We want to help shape its future alongside our peers across the continent, building a Europe that is stronger, more united, and better prepared for the challenges that lie ahead.

L'articolo What does EU integration mean to Montenegro’s youth? proviene da South East Europe Observatory.

The meeting concluded with the adoption of the Rome Charter, a political document promoted by Italy that seeks to reaffirm a number of principles considered essential for the future of EU enlargement. The initiative comes at a time of renewed European attention towards the integration of the Western Balkans into the European Union.

The Friends of the Western Balkans Group

The group brings together seven EU Member States – Italy, Austria, Croatia, Greece, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia – committed to supporting the EU accession paths of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. Hungary also took part in the Rome meeting for the first time, having been invited in recognition of its commitment to supporting the integration of the Western Balkans.

The meeting took place just two months after the previous ministerial gathering in Bratislava, reflecting the participating countries’ determination to keep the future of the Western Balkans and the EU enlargement process high on the European political agenda.

Alongside the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, representatives of international organisations and European institutions also attended, including the FAO Deputy Director-General, Maurizio Martina, the European Coordinator of the Western Balkans–Eastern Mediterranean Transport Corridor, Marian-Jean Marinescu and the InCE Secretary-General, Franco Dal Mas. Discussions focused not only on the EU accession process but also on strategic issues such as food security, supply chain resilience and strengthening regional connectivity.

What Does the Rome Charter Propose?

The main outcome of the meeting was the adoption of the Rome Charter, through which the participating countries call for preserving the credibility, predictability and unity of the enlargement process. The document reaffirms key principles for the future of enlargement, stressing the need to ensure that the accession process remains clear, coherent and firmly oriented towards the ultimate objective of EU membership.

Among its core principles is the reaffirmation of the full equality of Member States after accession. The Charter rejects models of “second-tier membership”, reaffirming that future members should enjoy the same rights and assume the same responsibilities as existing EU Member States.

The document also stresses the need to avoid introducing new conditionalities during the accession process. Any safeguard clauses or transitional measures, it states, should be based on objective, proportionate and temporary requirements, while taking into account the specific circumstances of each candidate country.

Italy’s Role in the Enlargement Debate

The initiative confirms Italy’s intention to play a leading role in the European debate on enlargement. In a message published on X following the meeting, Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani stressed the need to “give political priority to the reunification of the European family with the Balkans,” adding that “Italy intends to lead this process with a clear and determined strategic vision.” In the same message, he also highlighted the importance of strengthening transport infrastructure, energy networks and digital connectivity, referring to strategic projects such as IMEC and Corridor VIII while linking the enlargement process to broader issues including food security and Europe’s resilience.

A Dynamic Phase for the Enlargement Process

The Italian initiative comes at a particularly dynamic moment for EU enlargement. The adoption of the Rome Charter takes place just days before a new series of Intergovernmental Conferences scheduled in the framework of the EU General Affairs Council on 14 July.

On that occasion, the Irish Presidency aims to advance accession negotiations with Albania, Montenegro, Ukraine and Moldova. The objective is to continue closing additional negotiating chapters with Albania and Montenegro, while opening new negotiation clusters with Ukraine and Moldova. Serbia’s situation, however, remains different for the time being, as EU Member States have yet to reach consensus on opening the negotiating chapters currently under discussion.

Looking Ahead

The Rome Charter reaffirms a vision of the enlargement process based on principles shared by the participating countries: preserving the credibility of the accession process, ensuring clear rules, and guaranteeing that all future Member States join the European Union with equal rights and responsibilities.

At a time of significant geopolitical challenges, renewed support for the Western Balkans confirms that EU enlargement has returned to the centre of the European political debate. For the countries of the region, progress towards membership remains linked to meeting the accession criteria and implementing the required reforms. Within this context, the Rome Charter represents a political signal reaffirming the commitment of a group of EU Member States to an enlargement process that is credible, predictable and aimed at the full integration of the Western Balkans into the European Union.

Sources

• Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale, Al via la Riunione ministeriale del gruppo “Amici dei Balcani occidentali” (10 luglio 2026) – esteri.it
• ANSA, I Paesi del Gruppo Amici dei Balcani approvano la “Carta di Roma” (11 luglio 2026) – ansa.it
• Antonio Tajani, Post su X relativo alla riunione del Gruppo “Amici dei Balcani occidentali” (10 luglio 2026) – com/Antonio_Tajani
• Andrea Carli, Balcani occidentali nella Ue, vertice a Roma. Italia in pressing, Il Sole 24 Ore (10 luglio 2026) – ilsole24ore.com

L'articolo The Rome Charter: Italy’s renewed push for EU Enlargement in the Western Balkans proviene da South East Europe Observatory.

Regulation, however, is not advancing at the same pace.

While the adoption of AI is accelerating across the region, many countries still lack a comprehensive regulatory framework capable of governing its use. The result is an increasingly evident gap between technological innovation and the capacity of institutions to govern it. In a context where all Western Balkan countries are engaged, albeit at different speeds, in the process of European integration, the governance of artificial intelligence is becoming not only a technological challenge but also a new political one.

Serbia is currently the region’s most advanced case. It was the first country in South-Eastern Europe to adopt a National Strategy for the Development of Artificial Intelligence in 2019, which has recently been updated for the 2025–2030 period. Belgrade is also home to the AI Institute of Serbia, a research centre that brings together universities, public institutions, and businesses with the aim of developing AI applications in healthcare, industry, agriculture, and public administration.

Albania is also making significant investments in digital transformation. Through the e-Albania platform, a large share of public administrative services is now available online, and the government is showing growing interest in the potential of artificial intelligence to improve the efficiency of public administration. At the same time, the country’s EU accession process will require a gradual alignment with European standards, including those concerning AI.

In the remaining Western Balkan countries, the picture is more varied. Montenegro is developing its own national strategy with the support of European partners, while North Macedonia has identified digitalisation as one of the priorities of its reform agenda. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, institutional fragmentation makes it more difficult to develop coordinated policies, despite the fact that universities and businesses are already experimenting with artificial intelligence applications. Kosovo is also experiencing significant growth in its technology ecosystem and digital startup sector, but it still lacks a comprehensive framework dedicated to AI governance.

These differences demonstrate that technological innovation is not waiting for politics. Artificial intelligence applications are spreading rapidly, while legislation, regulatory authorities, and mechanisms to protect citizens are still struggling to keep pace.

The issue is far from theoretical. Who is accountable if an algorithm discriminates against a citizen when accessing a public service? How can transparency be ensured when decisions that affect people’s lives are entrusted to automated systems? What tools are needed to prevent algorithmic discrimination and protect personal data?

These are the very questions that the European Union has sought to address through the AI Act, the world’s first comprehensive regulatory framework dedicated to artificial intelligence. The regulation introduces a risk-based approach: the greater the potential impact of an AI system on fundamental rights, public safety, or the functioning of democratic institutions, the greater the obligations imposed on those who develop or deploy it.

For the Western Balkans, this represents much more than a simple legislative update. As has already happened with competition policy, data protection, and environmental legislation, the regulation of artificial intelligence will gradually become part of the EU acquis that candidate countries are required to adopt as they move forward in the accession process.

Regulation should not be interpreted as an obstacle to innovation. On the contrary, clear rules can strengthen public trust, attract investment, and create a more competitive digital ecosystem. A stable regulatory framework provides greater certainty for businesses investing in AI development while ensuring that technological progress advances in full respect of democratic principles and fundamental rights.

The challenge facing the Western Balkans will therefore be twofold: to continue fostering innovation without giving up the construction of strong institutions capable of governing it. This will require not only new legislation, but also investments in digital skills, public administration training, cybersecurity, data protection, and the strengthening of independent regulatory authorities.

Artificial intelligence is also rapidly becoming a new indicator of the institutional maturity of countries aspiring to join the European Union. The ability to combine innovation, transparency, and the protection of fundamental rights will increasingly determine whether these countries can build a digital ecosystem that meets European standards.

Ultimately, the question is not whether artificial intelligence will shape the future of the Western Balkans: it is already doing so. The real challenge is ensuring that innovation strengthens democracy, the rule of law, and citizens’ trust, rather than advancing faster than the ability of institutions to govern it. If the region succeeds in seizing this opportunity, AI can become not only a driver of economic growth but also another important step towards a more resilient, competitive, and fully European future.

Sources

• Courrier des Balkans, Dans les Balkans occidentaux, l’IA progresse plus vite que la loi.
• Governo della Repubblica di Serbia, Strategy for the Development of Artificial Intelligence 2025–2030.
• AI Institute of Serbia.
• Commissione europea, European Approach to Artificial Intelligence (AI Act).
• Governo della Repubblica d’Albania, piattaforma e-Albania.
• BIRN – Balkan Insight, Amid Concern over AI Abuse in Montenegro, Lawmakers Play Catch-Up.
• European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Programme to help the Western Balkans go digital.

L'articolo Artificial Intelligence in the Western Balkans: innovation is moving faster than regulation proviene da South East Europe Observatory.

When Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić announced his intention to resign “within the next few weeks”, the statement immediately attracted public attention. Speaking at a rally organised by the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) in Belgrade, he described the address as “probably” his last as President, saying that, after serving Serbia for fourteen years, he intends to step down from the presidency.

Rather than focusing solely on his resignation, Vučić used the speech to address Serbia’s current political situation, defend his government’s record and present several priorities for the period ahead.

An announcement in a tense political climate

The announcement comes after months of political tensions in Serbia, following the collapse of the Novi Sad railway station canopy in November 2024 and the student-led protests that followed. During the rally, Vučić announced that the governing coalition will contest the next parliamentary elections under the name United Serbia (Ujedinjena Srbija). He also confirmed that he intends to remain politically engaged and participate in that political effort.

More than a resignation announcement

Much of Vučić’s speech focused on issues beyond his resignation. According to the Serbian President, the country has faced attempts to undermine its stability over the past year. He criticised political opponents and the student protest movement, while reiterating his willingness to engage in dialogue.

Vučić also acknowledged that mistakes had been made within his own administration, stating that some officials appointed over the years had failed to earn citizens’ trust and should be replaced. The speech also included several policy announcements, including further pension increases, new foreign investment projects and a renewed commitment to Serbia’s position on Kosovo, where Vučić reiterated that dialogue remains possible but that the country’s territorial integrity is not open to negotiation.

Why has the announcement attracted so much attention?

Beyond the announcement itself, several important questions remain unanswered. Vučić did not indicate when his resignation would formally take effect, why he chose this particular moment to make the announcement, or what political role he intends to assume after leaving the presidency. For this reason, the announcement is likely to remain at the centre of Serbia’s political debate in the coming weeks, as attention shifts from the statement itself to the institutional and political developments that may follow.

What comes next?

Whether and how Vučić’s announced resignation could reshape Serbia’s political landscape remains to be seen. For now, the announcement raises important institutional and political questions whose answers are likely to emerge only in the coming weeks.

Source: N1 Serbia, “Vučić: Još nekoliko nedelja da budem predsednik, pa da podnosim ostavku” (27 June 2026).

L'articolo What’s behind Vučić’s resignation announcement? proviene da South East Europe Observatory.