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	<title>South East Europe Observatory</title>
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		<title>Serbia After Vučić: The Challenge of Democratic Transition</title>
		<link>https://www.seeobservatory.eu/serbia-after-vucic-the-challenge-of-democratic-transition/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[SEE Observatory]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2026 13:31:14 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.seeobservatory.eu/?p=1029</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>An article by Tatjana Đorđević, journalist and expert on the Western Balkans, for SEE Observatory. The student-backed movement has brought an end to fourteen years of political dominance by Aleksandar Vučić. But its historic electoral victory raises a more difficult question: can Serbia dismantle the system that sustained his power and build a functioning democracy? [&#8230;]</p>
<p>L'articolo <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu/serbia-after-vucic-the-challenge-of-democratic-transition/">Serbia After Vučić: The Challenge of Democratic Transition</a> proviene da <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu">South East Europe Observatory</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>An article by Tatjana Đorđević, journalist and expert on the Western Balkans, for SEE Observatory.</strong></span></p>
<p><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">The student-backed movement has brought an end to fourteen years of political dominance by Aleksandar Vučić. But its historic electoral victory raises a more difficult question: can Serbia dismantle the system that sustained his power and build a functioning democracy?</span></i></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">After almost two years of <strong>student-led protests</strong>, political confrontations and mounting tensions, many feared that election night could end in violence. Thousands of students and citizens were prepared to remain in the streets until the results were announced. The question was not simply who would win, but whether those in power would accept defeat.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Then came an unexpected moment. <strong>Aleksandar Vučić</strong>, the man who had dominated Serbian politics for fourteen years, appeared before the cameras and acknowledged his loss. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">&#8220;<em>It is clear that we have lost these elections. The Student List has won,</em>&#8221; Vučić declared, estimating that the <strong>student-backed movement</strong> would secure between 135 and 140 seats in Serbia&#8217;s 250-member parliament.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Yet his concession was far from an acceptance of political responsibility. Vučić blamed <strong>foreign interference</strong> and what he described as the American &#8220;deep state&#8221; for his defeat. He also warned that the incoming government would introduce sanctions against Russia within months, presenting this as an inevitable consequence of his opponents&#8217; victory. Insisting that he would remain in Serbia, he promised that his political movement would continue its struggle from the opposition.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">His speech reflected the narrative he had promoted throughout the protests, that the movement challenging his rule was not a genuine expression of public dissatisfaction, but part of a foreign-backed attempt to destabilise the country. </span><span style="font-weight: 400;">For the students, however, the result represented the culmination of almost two years of protests, university blockades, marches and an unprecedented mobilisation of citizens.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Yet defeating Vučić does not automatically mean dismantling the political system built around him. The SNS retains a substantial electoral base, extensive organisational networks and considerable influence within state institutions. Serbia&#8217;s central challenge is therefore not simply to replace a government, but to transform the way political power is exercised.</span></p>
<h2><span style="font-size: 20px;"><b>From protest to political power</b></span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The student movement emerged following the collapse of the railway station canopy in <strong>Novi Sad</strong> on November 1st 2024, which killed sixteen people. What began as a demand for <strong>justice and accountability</strong> gradually developed into a <strong>nationwide mobilisation</strong> against corruption and institutional dysfunction.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Through university blockades, mass demonstrations and grassroots initiatives such as “</span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">Student u svakom selu”</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;"> (A Student in Every Village), students reached citizens far beyond traditional opposition circles, including communities where Vučić&#8217;s party had long enjoyed strong support.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Their greatest strength was their independence from established political parties. By rejecting traditional leadership structures, they managed to unite people with different political views around a common demand: that Serbia&#8217;s institutions should serve its citizens rather than those in power. But the <strong>transition from protest to government</strong> will test that unity. A movement built around demands for accountability must now develop coherent economic, social and foreign policies, while preserving the trust of the broad coalition that brought it to power. Winning an election requires mobilisation, governing requires political choices, compromises and institutional competence.</span></p>
<h2><span style="font-size: 20px;"><b>Rebuilding institutions</b></span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The most difficult challenge facing the new leadership will be restoring the <strong>independence and credibility</strong> of Serbia&#8217;s institutions. During the SNS years, domestic and international observers repeatedly raised concerns about political interference in the judiciary, public administration, electoral processes and the media. The concentration of power around Vučić blurred the boundaries between the governing party and the state.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Reversing this process will require more than replacing senior officials. The new authorities must strengthen <strong>judicial independence</strong>, ensure transparency in public procurement, protect media freedom and create a professional public administration free from political interference.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">One particularly sensitive issue is </span><i><span style="font-weight: 400;">lustration</span></i><span style="font-weight: 400;">, a process aimed at establishing individual responsibility for abuses committed by public officials. Serbia has confronted this question before. Following the overthrow of Slobodan Milošević in 2000, the country adopted a lustration law in 2003. However, the legislation was never effectively implemented and expired in 2013. As a result, many of the political practices and networks associated with the previous system survived the democratic transition.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">A renewed<strong> lustration process</strong> could help establish accountability, but only if it is based on clear legal standards, independent procedures and respect for individual rights. Otherwise, it risks becoming an instrument of political revenge rather than democratic reform.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The lesson of Serbia&#8217;s transition after 2000 remains relevant today &#8211; removing a political leader does not necessarily dismantle the structures that enabled him to exercise power.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">There is also the question of <strong>political polarisation</strong>. Although the students have secured a parliamentary majority, Vučić&#8217;s coalition still represents a substantial part of the electorate. The new authorities will have to demonstrate that democratic change does not mean excluding those who supported the previous government. Respect for political pluralism and the rights of the opposition will be as important as the reforms themselves.</span></p>
<h2><span style="font-size: 20px;"><b>Serbia, Europe and the Western Balkans</b></span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The electoral result also opens a new chapter in Serbia&#8217;s relations with the <strong>European Union</strong> and its neighbours. Under Vučić, Belgrade pursued a delicate balancing act, maintaining its formal commitment to EU membership while cultivating close relations with Russia and China. Serbia also refused to align fully with European sanctions against Moscow, reflecting domestic political considerations, energy dependence and longstanding historical ties.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The student movement, however, did not emerge as an explicitly pro-European political project. Its demands were primarily domestic, accountability, the rule of law and the restoration of independent institutions. Its victory should therefore not automatically be interpreted as a <strong>geopolitical realignment</strong>. Relations with Russia, Kosovo&#8217;s status and Serbia&#8217;s national interests remain politically sensitive issues, including among supporters of the student movement.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">For the European Union, the change of government presents an opportunity to reconsider its approach to Serbia. For years, Brussels has faced criticism for prioritising regional stability and cooperation with Vučić over consistent pressure for democratic reforms. The new political environment could allow the EU to place greater emphasis on institutional reform, media freedom and the credibility of the accession process. Rather than building relations around individual political leaders, Brussels should focus on supporting democratic institutions and long-term reforms. The implications extend beyond Serbia, as a <strong>central political and economic actor</strong> in the Western Balkans, Serbia&#8217;s democratic development could influence regional stability and relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">However, expectations of an immediate transformation of Belgrade&#8217;s regional policy would be premature. The new leadership will have to reconcile domestic political pressures with the need for constructive relations with its neighbours.</span></p>
<h2><span style="font-size: 20px;"><b>The real test begins now</b></span></h2>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The students have achieved something Serbia&#8217;s traditional opposition failed to accomplish for more than a decade. They transformed a civic protest movement into a <strong>national political force</strong> and demonstrated that even a deeply entrenched political establishment can be defeated through democratic participation.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">But their victory marks the beginning of a more <strong>demanding phase</strong>. The new majority will need to maintain political cohesion, confront institutional weaknesses and resist the temptation to reproduce the practices it opposed. It must also prove that the principles that guided the protests can survive the compromises and responsibilities of government.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">Serbia&#8217;s democratic transition will ultimately be judged not by Vučić&#8217;s defeat, but by the independence of its institutions, the accountability of its leaders and the ability of citizens to exercise political choice freely.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">The students have proved that political power can change hands. Their greatest challenge will be to ensure that power itself is exercised differently.</p>
<p></span></p>
<hr />
<p data-pm-slice="1 1 []"><em><strong>Tatjana Đorđević</strong> is an award-winning journalist, writer and documentary filmmaker with over 20 years of experience, specializing in the Western Balkans, European geopolitics, human rights, conflict memory and migration. She contributes to international media outlets, including BBC News and La Stampa.</em></p>
<p>L'articolo <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu/serbia-after-vucic-the-challenge-of-democratic-transition/">Serbia After Vučić: The Challenge of Democratic Transition</a> proviene da <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu">South East Europe Observatory</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Flamingo Revolution: From an Environmental Protest to a Demand for Functional Democracy</title>
		<link>https://www.seeobservatory.eu/the-flamingo-revolution-from-an-environmental-protest-to-a-demand-for-functional-democracy/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[SEE Observatory]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 12:10:59 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.seeobservatory.eu/?p=1026</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>As European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen met Prime Minister Edi Rama in Tirana on 30 September, the first stop of her Western Balkans tour, protesters gathered outside the Prime Minister&#8217;s Office and clashed with police along the main boulevard. The visit centred on a new EU roadmap for Albania&#8217;s accession, ahead of the [&#8230;]</p>
<p>L'articolo <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu/the-flamingo-revolution-from-an-environmental-protest-to-a-demand-for-functional-democracy/">The Flamingo Revolution: From an Environmental Protest to a Demand for Functional Democracy</a> proviene da <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu">South East Europe Observatory</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As European Commission President <strong>Ursula von der Leyen</strong> met Prime Minister <strong>Edi Rama</strong> in <strong>Tirana</strong> on 30 September, the first stop of her Western Balkans tour, protesters gathered outside the Prime Minister&#8217;s Office and clashed with police along the main boulevard. The visit centred on a new <strong>EU roadmap for Albania&#8217;s accession</strong>, ahead of the Commission&#8217;s review of pre-accession policy on 6 October and the European Council&#8217;s discussion of enlargement on 15–16 October. In this piece, <strong>Mateo Spaho</strong>, head of the Pashko Liberal Institute, explains how the so-called Flamingo Revolution grew from an environmental dispute into a broader demand for functioning democratic institutions, the very standards on which Albania&#8217;s European path depends.</p>
<p><em>“Throughout the history of contemporary democracies, civic protests have often emerged in response to a specific grievance before evolving into broader movements that challenge the way political systems function. This phenomenon has been observed in many countries around the world and now appears to be unfolding in Albania through what has become known as the &#8220;Flamingo Revolution&#8221;. Initially centered on the protection of an environmentally sensitive area, the movement has gradually expanded its scope, articulating demands for greater transparency, institutional accountability, and the effective functioning of the rule of law.</em></p>
<p><em>The origins of the movement lie in public opposition to development projects affecting a protected natural area, where the flamingo became a symbol not only of environmental conservation but also of the public interest. It soon became evident, however, that the protesters&#8217; dissatisfaction extended far beyond environmental concerns. People gathered on Tirana boulevard to express frustration over a dysfunctional healthcare system, a public administration perceived as corrupt, and private property rights that, in their view, are increasingly threatened by powerful construction interests. For many participants, the core issue was the way public decisions are made, the lack of institutional transparency, and the limited ability of citizens to influence public policy-making.</em></p>
<p><em>This evolution is consistent with the theory of the American political scientist Robert Dahl, who argued that democracy cannot be reduced to the periodic holding of elections. Rather, it requires effective citizen participation, access to information, political pluralism, and institutions capable of guaranteeing fair competition. When these elements deteriorate, formal democracy risks losing its substantive meaning.</em></p>
<p><em>From this perspective, the protesters are not necessarily seeking to replace Albania&#8217;s constitutional order or its pluralist political system. Instead, they are demanding that pluralism become genuinely functional. This implies independent institutions, courts capable of applying the law free from political interference, a public administration that serves citizens rather than political interests, and effective mechanisms for holding the executive accountable.</em></p>
<p><em>Another significant aspect of the movement is its social composition. Various observers have noted the prominent presence of Albania&#8217;s urban middle class, including students, professionals, academics, small business owners, and highly educated citizens. Political science literature frequently identifies the middle class as one of the principal social foundations of liberal democracy because it tends to value institutional stability, legal certainty, fair economic competition, and accountable public administration. At the same time, the movement is far from being exclusively middle class. It has also attracted residents of affected communities, pensioners, environmental activists, and citizens from diverse social backgrounds.</em></p>
<p><em>In his classic work Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville argued that the strength of democracy lies not only in state institutions but also in the capacity of civil society to organize itself and hold political power accountable. The evolution of this protest can be interpreted in precisely this way: as an attempt to expand civic participation and make political authority more responsive to citizens.</em></p>
<p><em>Similarly, democratic theorists have argued that democracies do not necessarily collapse through military coups or abrupt constitutional breakdowns. More often, they erode gradually as institutions lose their independence, corruption becomes systemic, and citizens lose confidence that the law applies equally to everyone. From this perspective, demands for transparency, accountability, and a stronger rule of law should not be viewed as radical claims but as essential components of a healthy and functional democracy.</em></p>
<p><em>It remains to be seen to what extent this movement will preserve its civic character and avoid political co-optation, a challenge common to many long-lasting protest movements. Nevertheless, its development illustrates how a specific environmental dispute can evolve into a broader debate about democratic quality and institutional performance.</em></p>
<p><em>The protests, which have now continued for more than four months, bring together individuals with a wide range of political views and expectations. Some participants take a moderate position, supporting investment and economic development while demanding greater transparency regarding the concrete benefits that tourism and construction projects will bring to citizens. Others are former supporters of the governing Socialist Party who feel disillusioned with Prime Minister Edi Rama&#8217;s government, arguing that it no longer reflects traditional center-left values. There are also conservatives who seek a democratic alternation of power, civil society organizations concerned about the weakening of democratic institutions, and Albanian emigrants who have returned home to protest because they believe Albanians deserve to be heard by their government in the same way that citizens are in many European Union member states.</em></p>
<p><em>The aspirations represented within the movement are equally diverse. Some participants hope the protests will eventually lead to the emergence of a new political force. What appears to unite many protesters, however, is their rejection of the long-standing political dominance of Edi Rama, Albania&#8217;s current Prime Minister, and Sali Berisha, the leader of the opposition. Over the past thirty-five years (1991–2026), these two political figures have largely defined Albania&#8217;s political landscape. During this period, the country has often been described by international observers as a hybrid democracy. For many citizens, the ultimate objective is not merely political alternation but the transformation of Albania into a fully consolidated democracy in which democratic institutions, the rule of law, and equal citizenship are experienced in everyday life rather than existing only as constitutional principles.</em></p>
<p><em>Ultimately, the significance of the Flamingo Revolution extends well beyond the environmental issue that originally inspired it. What makes the movement politically noteworthy is its transformation from a localized dispute into a broader national reflection on the relationship between citizens and the state. If democracy is understood as more than the mere conduct of periodic elections, then the protesters&#8217; demands for independent institutions, the rule of law, and public accountability represent an effort to make Albanian democracy not only formally democratic, but genuinely functional.”</em></p>
<p><strong>Prof. Assoc. Dr. Mateo Spaho</strong> &#8211; Head of “Pashko” Liberal Institute</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>Sources</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://euronews.al/en/ursula-von-der-leyen-in-tirana-welcomed-by-rama-with-an-official-ceremony/">Ursula von der Leyen in Tirana, welcomed by Rama with an official ceremony</a> – Euronews Albania, 30 September 2026</li>
<li><a href="https://albaniandailynews.com/news/tensions-erupt-in-tirana-as-eu-commission-president-ursula-von-der-leyen-visits-albania">Tensions Erupt in Tirana as EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen Visits Albania</a> – Albanian Daily News, 30 September 2026</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>L'articolo <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu/the-flamingo-revolution-from-an-environmental-protest-to-a-demand-for-functional-democracy/">The Flamingo Revolution: From an Environmental Protest to a Demand for Functional Democracy</a> proviene da <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu">South East Europe Observatory</a>.</p>
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		<title>Progressive benefits on the path to EU Membership: the SEE Observatory proposal for the Western Balkans</title>
		<link>https://www.seeobservatory.eu/progressive-benefits-on-the-path-to-eu-membership-the-see-observatory-proposal-for-the-western-balkans/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[SEE Observatory]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 21 Sep 2026 17:17:25 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.seeobservatory.eu/?p=1009</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>One of the central contributions of the first SEE Observatory Annual Forum, held on 15 September at the Ridotto del Teatro Verdi in Trieste, was the presentation of the SEE Observatory Charter. Presented by Ambassador Luigi Mattiolo, Honorary President of the SEE Observatory, the Charter outlines a progressive approach to Western Balkan integration. Its central [&#8230;]</p>
<p>L'articolo <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu/progressive-benefits-on-the-path-to-eu-membership-the-see-observatory-proposal-for-the-western-balkans/">Progressive benefits on the path to EU Membership: the SEE Observatory proposal for the Western Balkans</a> proviene da <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu">South East Europe Observatory</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p class="PDq2pG_selectionAnchorContainer" dir="auto" data-start="1230" data-end="1431">One of the central contributions of the first <strong data-start="1276" data-end="1308">SEE Observatory Annual Forum</strong>, held on 15 September at the Ridotto del Teatro Verdi in Trieste, was the presentation of the <strong data-start="1403" data-end="1430">SEE Observatory Charter</strong>. Presented by <strong data-start="1449" data-end="1521">Ambassador Luigi Mattiolo, Honorary President of the SEE Observatory</strong>, the Charter outlines a progressive approach to Western Balkan integration.</p>
<p dir="auto" data-start="1602" data-end="1834">Its central idea is that, as candidate countries implement reforms and make verified progress in specific sectors, they should be able to gradually experience some of the benefits associated with EU membership before full accession.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">This approach is not presented as an alternative to full membership. Rather, it seeks to make the integration process more credible and predictable by linking concrete progress to tangible benefits along the way.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">Presenting the Charter, Mattiolo placed Western Balkan integration within a broader international context. In an increasingly fragmented and polarised world, he argued, completing Europe’s integration, including the Western Balkans, has become a strategic interest for the continent.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>Italy and Montenegro in Dialogue on Western Balkan Integration</strong></span></p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">The proposal became part of the institutional discussion during the <strong>Interactive Dialogue “Accelerating Western Balkans Integration as a Strategic Choice for Europe’s Future”</strong>, moderated by Ambassador Luigi Mattiolo, with the participation of <strong>Antonio Tajani</strong>, Vice President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Italy, and <strong>Ervin Ibrahimović</strong>, Deputy Prime Minister for International Relations and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">Ibrahimović highlighted Montenegro’s commitment to its European path and the importance of a merit-based approach, linking progress towards membership to reforms and continued cooperation with European partners. He reiterated Montenegro’s ambition to complete negotiations by 2026 and work towards EU membership in 2028.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">Tajani called for a change in the way the process itself is described. Rather than speaking only of EU <strong>“enlargement”</strong>, he proposed the concept of European <strong>“reunification”</strong>, stressing that the Western Balkan countries are European countries and that their integration is part of completing the European project.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">At the same time, he emphasised that rigorous procedures should not become an obstacle to political progress and argued that the process should not be weakened by excessive bureaucracy or continued delays.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">Towards the end of the dialogue, the discussion returned directly to the proposal presented by the SEE Observatory. Tajani expressed appreciation for the Observatory’s contribution and for the idea of a less bureaucratic model of integration, expressing support for an approach capable of providing candidate countries with concrete benefits as they make verified progress towards membership.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">The exchange gave the <strong>SEE Observatory Charter</strong> a direct place within the wider political discussion of the Forum.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>Security, economy and connectivity</strong></span></p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">Security was closely linked to the discussion. Ibrahimović stressed that the security of the Western Balkans and the security of Europe are closely interconnected, while Tajani placed the region within the wider debate on European security and defence.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">The dialogue also explored the economic dimension of integration.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">Ibrahimović highlighted the relationship between Montenegro and Italy and pointed to energy, renewable sources, education, research, entrepreneurship and investment as areas where closer cooperation can already generate concrete opportunities. The electricity interconnection between Italy and Montenegro was also recalled as an example of existing links between the two countries.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">Tajani similarly connected Western Balkan integration with the creation of a larger and stronger European market, highlighting the opportunities that closer economic integration could create for trade, investment, tourism and the movement of people.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">Connectivity was another important element of the discussion. The strategic position of <strong>Trieste and the Upper Adriatic</strong>, together with links towards the Western Balkans and Central Europe, was considered within the broader development of international transport and trade corridors.</p>
<p class="isSelectedEnd">Across the discussion, integration therefore emerged not only as an institutional process, but as one that also develops through economic relations, energy, infrastructure and direct connections between countries and people.</p>
<p>With the presentation of the Charter, the SEE Observatory brought its proposal into this wider institutional debate: linking verified progress towards EU membership with tangible benefits along the way, while maintaining full accession as the final objective.</p>
<p>L'articolo <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu/progressive-benefits-on-the-path-to-eu-membership-the-see-observatory-proposal-for-the-western-balkans/">Progressive benefits on the path to EU Membership: the SEE Observatory proposal for the Western Balkans</a> proviene da <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu">South East Europe Observatory</a>.</p>
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		<title>The SEE Observatory Annual Forum: accelerate Western Balkans Integration as a Strategic Choice for Europe’s Future</title>
		<link>https://www.seeobservatory.eu/the-see-observatory-annual-forum/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[SEE Observatory]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 17 Sep 2026 15:26:42 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.seeobservatory.eu/?p=1000</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>How can Europe accelerate the integration of the Western Balkans and make the process more concrete, credible and effective? This question was at the heart of the first SEE Observatory Annual Forum, held on 15 September at the Ridotto del Teatro Verdi in Trieste under the title “Accelerating Western Balkans Integration as a Strategic Choice [&#8230;]</p>
<p>L'articolo <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu/the-see-observatory-annual-forum/">The SEE Observatory Annual Forum: accelerate Western Balkans Integration as a Strategic Choice for Europe’s Future</a> proviene da <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu">South East Europe Observatory</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>How can Europe accelerate the integration of the Western Balkans and make the process more concrete, credible and effective?</em></p>
<p>This question was at the heart of the first <strong>SEE Observatory Annual Forum</strong>, held on 15 September at the Ridotto del Teatro Verdi in Trieste under the title <strong>“Accelerating Western Balkans Integration as a Strategic Choice for Europe’s Future.”</strong></p>
<p>The Forum brought together institutional representatives, policymakers, diplomats and younger generations for a discussion that went beyond the accession process itself, addressing the political, security and economic dimensions of Western Balkan integration and its significance for Europe’s future.</p>
<p>The Annual Forum also brought to Trieste the different strands of the SEE Observatory’s work developed throughout 2026. The <strong>Liberal Dialogues</strong> had taken the debate on Europe’s future across the region, while the <strong>SEE Youth Forum</strong>, held the previous day at MIB Trieste School of Management, created a space for younger generations to identify shared priorities and develop proposals for future initiatives.</p>
<p><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>Western Balkan Integration as a European Priority</strong></span></p>
<p>Opening the Forum, <strong>Andrea Cangini</strong>, Director of the SEE Observatory and Secretary General of the Luigi Einaudi Foundation, reflected on the purpose behind the Observatory and the work developed during its first year. He recalled the role of the Liberal Dialogues in bringing together hundreds of young people, academics and representatives from across the region, placing the promotion of the European ideal and liberal thought among younger generations at the centre of the Observatory’s mission. For Cangini, accelerating the integration of the Western Balkans represents both a political and strategic imperative for Europe.</p>
<p>The relationship between Trieste, Friuli Venezia Giulia and South-East Europe also emerged strongly during the institutional opening.</p>
<p><strong>Massimiliano Fedriga</strong>, President of the Autonomous Region of Friuli Venezia Giulia, described the region – and Trieste in particular – not simply as a bridge towards the Balkans, but as <strong>“the bridge of the Balkans towards Europe.”</strong> His intervention highlighted the role of people, infrastructure and economic connections in turning institutional integration into a concrete process.</p>
<p><strong>Vladimir Nanut</strong>, Founder and CEO of MIB Trieste School of Management and Board Member of the SEE Observatory, recalled the School’s long-standing international vocation and its relationship with Central and Eastern Europe, stressing the importance of combining European values with the skills needed to prepare future generations of leaders.</p>
<p><strong>Franco Dal Mas</strong>, Secretary General of the Central European Initiative, also framed the process as one of European reunification rather than simply enlargement, placing younger generations at the centre of this perspective: <em>“Young people are not tomorrow, they are today, and it is today that we build Europe.”</em></p>
<p><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>Bringing Young Voices into the Annual Forum</strong></span></p>
<p>Younger generations also had a direct role in the programme. During the round table <strong>“Our Idea of Europe: Young People’s Proposals”</strong>, moderated by <strong>Eva Ciuk</strong>, Scientific Director and Coordinator of the SEE Observatory Scientific Committee, the five winners of the SEE Observatory scholarships shared their vision of Europe and presented their perspectives to the institutional representatives attending the Forum.</p>
<p>Their participation created a direct connection with the <strong>SEE Youth Forum</strong> held the previous day, where young people and professors representing the countries within the SEE Observatory’s area of interest, alongside a delegation from <strong>UWC Adriatic</strong>, had worked together to identify priorities, proposals and project ideas for the future of Europe and regional cooperation.</p>
<p>The round table was followed by the <strong>Scholarship Award Ceremony</strong>, during which the five SEE Observatory scholarships were presented, together with the annual scholarship for the MBA in International Business at MIB Trieste School of Management.</p>
<p><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>From the First Annual Forum to the Next Phase</strong></span></p>
<p>A central moment of the Forum was the institutional dialogue moderated by <strong>Ambassador Luigi Mattiolo</strong>, Honorary President of the SEE Observatory, with <strong>Antonio Tajani</strong>, Vice President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Italy, and <strong>Ervin Ibrahimović</strong>, Deputy Prime Minister for International Relations and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro. The Forum also provided an opportunity for the SEE Observatory to present a concrete proposal – the <strong>SEE Observatory Charter</strong> – aimed at making Western Balkan integration more tangible and credible.</p>
<p>The first SEE Observatory Annual Forum thus brought together the different dimensions of the Observatory’s work in 2026: the regional dialogue developed through the <strong>Liberal Dialogues</strong>, the involvement of younger generations through the <strong>SEE Youth Forum</strong>, and the institutional debate on the future integration of the Western Balkans. The ideas and proposals developed throughout this journey now provide a basis for the Observatory’s future activities and for the next edition of the <strong>Liberal Dialogues</strong>, continuing the conversation across Central and South-East Europe.</p>
<p><strong>Read more about the SEE Observatory Charter and the institutional dialogue on Western Balkan integration in our dedicated article.</strong></p>
<p>L'articolo <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu/the-see-observatory-annual-forum/">The SEE Observatory Annual Forum: accelerate Western Balkans Integration as a Strategic Choice for Europe’s Future</a> proviene da <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu">South East Europe Observatory</a>.</p>
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		<title>Building Europe Together: The Voices of a New Generation from the SEE Youth and Annual Forums</title>
		<link>https://www.seeobservatory.eu/building-europe-together-the-voices-of-a-new-generation-from-the-see-youth-and-annual-forums/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[SEE Observatory]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 17 Sep 2026 14:01:59 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.seeobservatory.eu/?p=966</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>What kind of Europe do younger generations want to build? And what happens when young people from across Central and South-East Europe are given the opportunity not only to discuss its future, but to shape concrete ideas together? These questions were at the heart of the SEE Youth Forum 2026, held on 14 September at [&#8230;]</p>
<p>L'articolo <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu/building-europe-together-the-voices-of-a-new-generation-from-the-see-youth-and-annual-forums/">Building Europe Together: The Voices of a New Generation from the SEE Youth and Annual Forums</a> proviene da <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu">South East Europe Observatory</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>What kind of Europe do younger generations want to build? And what happens when young people from across Central and South-East Europe are given the opportunity not only to discuss its future, but to shape concrete ideas together?</em></p>
<p>These questions were at the heart of the <strong>SEE Youth Forum 2026</strong>, held on 14 September at MIB Trieste School of Management. Promoted by the SEE Observatory, the Forum brought together young people from across the region, alongside professors and experts, for a participatory workshop focused on some of Europe’s key challenges: democratic participation, dialogue, peace and security, sustainability, freedom of expression and regional cooperation.</p>
<p>Rather than being simply a space for discussion, the Youth Forum was conceived as a laboratory of ideas. Guided by <strong>Irena Topalli</strong>, an expert in civil society and youth policies, participants worked in groups, comparing experiences and perspectives from their respective countries to identify shared priorities and develop proposals for the future of Europe and regional cooperation. Their contributions will help shape the themes and activities of the <strong>Liberal Dialogues 2027</strong>.</p>
<p>The Forum brought together participants from Italy and from all the countries within the SEE Observatory’s area of interest, alongside a <strong>delegation of students from UWC Adriatic</strong>, creating a genuinely regional space for exchange between different experiences and perspectives.</p>
<p>Among the participants were the five winners of the SEE Observatory international call <strong>“How to Build the Europe I Would Like”</strong>: Draga Gajić from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Tea Radunović from Montenegro, Algert Bici from Albania, Marina Cossu from Italy and Jana Djudjic from Serbia.</p>
<p>The Youth Forum was not an isolated event. The ideas developed on 14 September were brought into the institutional conversation the following day, when the SEE Observatory Annual Forum gathered young people, policymakers and institutional representatives at Trieste’s Ridotto del Teatro Verdi. There, the five young participants received their €1,000 scholarships and shared their reflections on Europe in the context of a high-level discussion attended by, among others, <strong>Antonio Tajani</strong>, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Italy, and <strong>Ervin Ibrahimović</strong>, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro.</p>
<p><span style="color: #000080;"><a style="color: #000080;" href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iqRRwvbbqZs&amp;t=3405s"><strong>Watch the full SEE Observatory Annual Forum here!</strong></a></span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>Five Voices, One European Conversation</strong></span></p>
<p>Different backgrounds and perspectives converged around common priorities: peace, trust, participation and the need to make young people active contributors to the European project.</p>
<p>For <strong>Draga Gajić</strong>, who recalled growing up in Banja Luka and reflected on the impact of war on her family history, peace cannot be taken for granted. “We all need to work on peace and build peace, because peace is not given,” she said. Dialogue, tolerance and individual responsibility are therefore essential, particularly at a time when democracy and liberal values are facing growing pressure. After meeting and working with the young participants in Trieste, her conclusion was one of confidence: <strong>“Europe is in good hands.”</strong></p>
<p><strong>Tea Radunović</strong> invited the audience to imagine Europe “through children’s eyes”: a Europe capable of preserving dreams and hopes, but also of questioning what is wrong rather than simply accepting it. <strong>“Why does it have to be this way?”</strong> she asked, calling for a Europe that pays greater attention to people, opportunities and future generations.</p>
<p>For <strong>Algert Bici</strong>, Europe should be more than a union of countries. It should be a community where young people can have equal opportunities regardless of where they come from, built on solidarity, cooperation and respect, and able to combine innovation with democracy.</p>
<p>The value of dialogue emerged strongly from <strong>Marina Cossu’s</strong> experience. Meeting young people from the Western Balkans and hearing how they look at the European Union with hope changed her own perspective. The exchange showed how bringing together people with different experiences can challenge assumptions and strengthen a shared sense of European belonging.</p>
<p><strong>Jana Djudjic</strong> focused on another crucial issue: the distance between young people and institutions. Her call was to bring younger generations <strong>“into the heart of institutions”</strong>, creating spaces where they can understand European processes, participate and recognise the value of their contribution. Her final message captured the spirit of the discussion: <strong>“Never forget that your voice is our Europe.”</strong></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>From Trieste to the Liberal Dialogues 2027</strong></span></p>
<p>From the collaborative work of the Youth Forum to the stage of the Annual Forum, the two days in Trieste offered a common message: Europe’s future cannot be discussed without the generations that will live it.</p>
<p>For the SEE Observatory, their ideas are not intended to remain within the Forum. They will become part of the work leading towards the <strong>Liberal Dialogues 2027</strong>, continuing a process designed to turn dialogue between young Europeans into participation, cooperation and concrete proposals for the future of the continent.</p>
<p>L'articolo <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu/building-europe-together-the-voices-of-a-new-generation-from-the-see-youth-and-annual-forums/">Building Europe Together: The Voices of a New Generation from the SEE Youth and Annual Forums</a> proviene da <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu">South East Europe Observatory</a>.</p>
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		<title>After Mladić: Serbia’s Unfinished Reckoning with the Past</title>
		<link>https://www.seeobservatory.eu/after-mladic-serbias-unfinished-reckoning-with-the-past/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[SEE Observatory]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 07 Sep 2026 10:57:51 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.seeobservatory.eu/?p=824</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>An article by Tatjana Đorđević. There is an abandoned agricultural warehouse in Kravica, a few kilometres from Srebrenica. There is no memorial plaque outside, nothing to tell a visitor that on 13 and 14 July 1995, between 1,000 and more than 1,300 Bosniak men and boys were killed inside and around this former agricultural cooperative. [&#8230;]</p>
<p>L'articolo <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu/after-mladic-serbias-unfinished-reckoning-with-the-past/">After Mladić: Serbia’s Unfinished Reckoning with the Past</a> proviene da <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu">South East Europe Observatory</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em><strong>An article by Tatjana Đorđević.</strong></em></p>
<p>There is an abandoned agricultural warehouse in Kravica, a few kilometres from Srebrenica. There is no memorial plaque outside, nothing to tell a visitor that on 13 and 14 July 1995, between 1,000 and more than 1,300 Bosniak men and boys were killed inside and around this former agricultural cooperative.</p>
<p>The massacre was one of the first mass executions following the fall of Srebrenica and formed part of the genocide in which more than 8,000 Bosniak men and boys were killed. The forces responsible were under the command of General Ratko Mladić. Mladić died on 27 August at the age of 84 in the prison hospital in The Hague, where he was serving a life sentence. In 2021, his conviction for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes became final. His death should have closed one of the darkest chapters of the wars that accompanied the breakup of Yugoslavia. Instead, it demonstrated how politically alive that past remains.</p>
<p>In Serbia and Republika Srpska, politicians, nationalist organisations and parts of the public mourned Mladić as a hero. Memorial gatherings were organised in several cities, while graffiti and banners celebrating him appeared once again in public spaces. Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić criticised the UN International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals for refusing previous requests to release Mladić on health grounds. Serbia also announced that, as a former general, Mladić would be buried with military and state honours. The controversy goes far beyond the funeral of one man.</p>
<p>More than thirty years after the Bosnian war, the case of Ratko Mladić exposes the continuing gap between judicial truth and political memory in the Western Balkans. International courts have established the facts of Srebrenica and Mladić’s responsibility. Yet court verdicts alone have not created a common understanding of the past. This unresolved legacy is particularly important for Serbia, a country that formally remains committed to joining the European Union.</p>
<p>European integration is usually discussed through negotiating chapters, economic reforms, rule-of-law benchmarks and institutional changes. But becoming part of the European political community is also about democratic culture: the ability of institutions and societies to confront established facts, recognise victims and reject the political glorification of those convicted of the gravest crimes. This is where Serbia continues to face a profound contradiction.</p>
<p>Its governments have maintained EU membership as a strategic objective while nationalist narratives about the wars of the 1990s continue to occupy an important place in public life. Rather than disappearing with time, those narratives can be reactivated whenever they become politically useful. Mladić’s death offered another example.</p>
<p>By shifting attention from the crimes for which he was convicted to his treatment by the Hague tribunal, political discourse can transform a convicted war criminal into a victim and Serbia itself into the victim of an allegedly hostile international order. This narrative is not new. For decades, it has helped turn questions of individual criminal responsibility into questions of collective national grievance.</p>
<p>Perhaps more worrying is that the debate is no longer confined to the generation that lived through the wars. Serbia’s young people are divided as well. The student protest movement that has challenged Vučić’s system of power includes many young people demanding accountability, stronger institutions and a more democratic country. Yet nationalist currents are also visible among the younger generation. Following Mladić’s death, some students publicly mourned him, while a large banner displayed on Belgrade’s Branko Bridge declared: “Our freedom lives through your struggle.” Many of those taking part in this debate were not even born when the Bosnian war ended. That is why the politics of memory matters for Serbia’s future. If younger generations inherit the same unresolved narratives, historical revisionism ceases to be simply a legacy of the past. It becomes part of the political culture of the future.</p>
<p>This also presents a challenge for the European Union. The EU has renewed its attention to enlargement, and the Western Balkans have once again become strategically important in a Europe transformed by war in Ukraine and geopolitical competition. Serbia remains essential to the stability and European future of the region. But enlargement cannot be reduced to geopolitical necessity.</p>
<p>A European future for the Western Balkans also requires democratic resilience, functioning institutions, regional cooperation and genuine reconciliation. None of these is easily compatible with the continued public glorification of individuals convicted of genocide and crimes against humanity. Ratko Mladić’s death therefore leaves Serbia with a question that is larger than Mladić himself.</p>
<p>The issue is not whether Serbian society must accept a single interpretation of every aspect of the Yugoslav wars. Democratic societies inevitably debate their history. But such debate must begin with established facts and with a clear distinction between historical discussion and the glorification of crimes. Serbia’s European path will ultimately depend not only on what laws it adopts or negotiating chapters it closes, but also on what kind of political culture it chooses to build.</p>
<p>More than thirty years after Srebrenica, the past is still capable of returning to Serbia’s streets, dividing a new generation and becoming an instrument of contemporary politics.</p>
<p>Ratko Mladić is dead. The more difficult question is whether the political culture that turned him into a hero can finally be left behind.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>Further reading</strong></span></p>
<p><strong>Valigia Blu</strong> — <span style="color: #000080;"><a style="color: #000080;" href="https://www.valigiablu.it/morte-mladic-boia-srebrenica-eredita-europa/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Il boia di Srebrenica è morto, la sua mostruosa ideologia si aggira ancora per l’Europa</a></span></p>
<p><strong>Osservatorio Balcani Caucaso Transeuropa</strong> — <span style="color: #000080;"><a style="color: #000080;" href="https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/cp_article/mladic-e-morto-ma-non-la-sua-ideologia/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Mladić è morto, ma non la sua ideologia</a></span></p>
<p>L'articolo <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu/after-mladic-serbias-unfinished-reckoning-with-the-past/">After Mladić: Serbia’s Unfinished Reckoning with the Past</a> proviene da <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu">South East Europe Observatory</a>.</p>
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		<title>Lessons from Iceland: Europe Can No Longer Take Accession for Granted, Not Even in the Balkans</title>
		<link>https://www.seeobservatory.eu/lessons-from-iceland-europe-can-no-longer-take-accession-for-granted-not-even-in-the-balkans/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[SEE Observatory]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 04 Sep 2026 10:10:02 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.seeobservatory.eu/?p=821</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Iceland&#8217;s &#8216;no&#8217; to reopening negotiations shows that joining the EU is no longer a foregone conclusion. As Brussels drags its feet, Russia, China, Turkey, and the US are vying for influence, investments and security in the Balkans. The outcome of the Icelandic referendum &#8211; with 52.8% of voters rejecting the resumption of European Union accession [&#8230;]</p>
<p>L'articolo <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu/lessons-from-iceland-europe-can-no-longer-take-accession-for-granted-not-even-in-the-balkans/">Lessons from Iceland: Europe Can No Longer Take Accession for Granted, Not Even in the Balkans</a> proviene da <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu">South East Europe Observatory</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Iceland&#8217;s &#8216;no&#8217; to reopening negotiations shows that joining the EU is no longer a foregone conclusion. As Brussels drags its feet, Russia, China, Turkey, and the US are vying for influence, investments and security in the Balkans.</em></p>
<p>The outcome of the Icelandic referendum &#8211; with 52.8% of voters rejecting the resumption of European Union accession negotiations—does not represent a mere episode of Nordic folklore, nor a technical dispute over the exploitation of fishing quotas in the North Atlantic. Rather, it constitutes a political-constitutional earthquake of systemic magnitude, capable of exposing the obsolescence of international constraints in the contemporary multipolar context. The vote in Reykjavik certifies an inconvenient truth that European chancelleries prefer to ignore: membership in the European Union is no longer perceived as an inevitable and unavoidable historical destiny, but rather as a bureaucratic and regulatory cost that certain peripheral partners deliberately choose not to bear.</p>
<p>The decision of the small Arctic Republic must be interpreted as an exercise of cold, calculating functional realism, matured in a global environment where security has been structurally decoupled from political integration. Iceland conducted an extreme pragmatic cost-benefit analysis: its military deterrence and the physical protection of its territory are already fully guaranteed by the Atlantic Alliance, while access to the single market is secured through its participation in the European Economic Area. Within such a framework, ceding significant portions of national sovereignty and decision-making autonomy to Brussels to obtain a marginal “plus” compared to the status quo was deemed a disadvantageous bargain. The classic “European package” &#8211; which inextricably links legislative harmonization, market access, and political conditionality &#8211; has been unbundled and rejected.</p>
<p>This conceptual short-circuit carries disruptive implications for the European Union&#8217;s action in its southern quadrant, exposing the structural fragilities of the enlargement process toward the Western Balkans. For over two decades, Brussels has managed its geographical neighbourhood through a purely technical-bureaucratic approach, treating accession as an endless maturity exam. The ritual has remained identical and static: thirty-five negotiating chapters to open and close, a dense constellation of technical and judicial benchmarks to tick off, annual assessments conducted by a Commission perceived as a cold and distant judge, and finally, a verdict demanding the political unanimity of the EU-27. This practice has been founded on an unshakable, fideistic conviction: the idea that the intrinsic attractiveness of the EU model and the transformative power of its rules were self-sufficient magnetic forces, capable on their own of inducing democratic convergence and lasting reforms.</p>
<p>The contrast between Iceland and the Balkan peninsula reveals the trap of this framework. While the Arctic island can afford the luxury of refusal due to its democratic stability and geostrategic position, the countries of the Western Balkans are fragile, exposed realities contiguous to the European Union. Yet, the political elites of the Region have drawn the exact same conclusion as Icelandic voters: formal accession to Brussels is no longer the only game in town. Rather than accelerating along the path of reforms, opportunistic and illiberal leaderships have understood how to politically monetise a state of permanent transition, transforming it into a lucrative geopolitical rent. Exploiting European procedural delays as an alibi, these ruling classes play simultaneously at multiple tables within a highly competitive alliance market. They negotiate opaque infrastructural investments with China, tolerate Russian interference and energy blackmail, open security channels with Turkey, and forge informal axes of cooperation with Trump-aligned conservative networks. They cash in on immediate resources without having to submit to any democratic or rule-of-law conditionalities.</p>
<p>The Union&#8217;s failure lies in its obstinacy in defending the Monnet Method, a model designed for an era of slow, linear, and predictable peace &#8211; for a world in which cohesion could gradually radiate from the bureaucratic center toward the periphery. Today, history is running in the opposite direction. Faced with asymmetric threats and Russia&#8217;s hybrid warfare, it is the periphery that behaves as the true Europe, while the decision-making center remains paralysed by its own political hesitations and opportunistic vetoes. Ukraine proves this: on the battlefield, its army has fused heterogeneous Western military technologies into a single digital defense system, becoming the operational vanguard of a common European defense that Brussels has yet to even theorise.</p>
<p>The unspoken truth hovering in the corridors of the Berlaymont is that the Union&#8217;s current, fragile stability rests not on integration, but on calculated, strategic exclusion. Keeping the Western Balkans locked in an eternal waiting room has become the daily institutional sedative for Brussels. This permanent buffer zone serves a weak Europe by allowing it to offload its own crises &#8211; starting with Italian migration policies and the failed centers of Shengjin and Gjadër in Albania &#8211; without granting these countries a seat in the Council, which would alter internal political balances and force a reform of the unanimity rule. The <em>acquis communautaire</em> no longer acts as an ideal horizon, but as a mental bunker erected to defend a sclerotic status quo.</p>
<p>The consequences of this political vacuum are evident and dangerous. To avert the collapse of its own security, the European Union must abandon the binary logic of all-or-nothing and adopt the posture of a geopolitical power. Today, the Eastern frontier stretching from Tirana to Kyiv represents the new <em>limes</em> of the West. If Brussels continues to take refuge in the swamp of its own regulations, someone else will write the rules of continental security in its place. To avoid condemning itself to sclerosis, Europe must have the courage to transform its bureaucracy into politics, offering real protection and safeguards today, lest it be subjected to the force of tomorrow’s autocrats.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The original article in Italian by Gianluca Eramo was published on Linkiesta at the following link: <span style="color: #000080;"><a style="color: #000080;" href="https://www.linkiesta.it/2026/09/lezioni-islanda-ue-balcani-adesione/">www.linkiesta.it</a></span></p>
<p>L'articolo <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu/lessons-from-iceland-europe-can-no-longer-take-accession-for-granted-not-even-in-the-balkans/">Lessons from Iceland: Europe Can No Longer Take Accession for Granted, Not Even in the Balkans</a> proviene da <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu">South East Europe Observatory</a>.</p>
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		<title>Why 2026 Could Be a Decisive Year for EU Enlargement</title>
		<link>https://www.seeobservatory.eu/why-2026-could-be-a-decisive-year-for-eu-enlargement/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[SEE Observatory]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 06 Aug 2026 16:29:36 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.seeobservatory.eu/?p=814</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Italy has described 2026 as a decisive year for EU enlargement, placing the Western Balkans back at the centre of its European agenda. But what makes the coming year so significant? &#8220;2026 is a decisive year.&#8221; With these words, Italy&#8217;s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Antonio Tajani reaffirmed his government&#8217;s commitment to [&#8230;]</p>
<p>L'articolo <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu/why-2026-could-be-a-decisive-year-for-eu-enlargement/">Why 2026 Could Be a Decisive Year for EU Enlargement</a> proviene da <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu">South East Europe Observatory</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4><strong><em>Italy has described 2026 as a decisive year for EU enlargement, placing the Western Balkans back at the centre of its European agenda. But what makes the coming year so significant?</em></strong></h4>
<p><strong>&#8220;2026 is a decisive year.&#8221;</strong> With these words, Italy&#8217;s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs <strong>Antonio Tajani</strong> reaffirmed his government&#8217;s commitment to the European integration of the Western Balkans during the launch of Italy&#8217;s Presidency of the <strong>EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region (EUSAIR)</strong>.</p>
<p>Describing the reunification of the Western Balkans with the European Union as &#8220;<em>the greatest strategic investment Europe can make,</em>&#8221; Tajani also reiterated that enlargement remains &#8220;<em>an absolute strategic priority</em>&#8221; for both the Italian Government and Italian foreign policy. His remarks presented enlargement not simply as a political objective, but as part of a broader strategy centred on regional cooperation, connectivity and economic development.</p>
<h4><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>Italy&#8217;s vision for the Adriatic-Ionian region</strong></span></h4>
<p>As Italy takes over the Presidency of EUSAIR for the next twelve months, Rome intends to strengthen cooperation between European institutions, national governments, regional authorities and civil society.</p>
<p>Established by the European Union in 2014, <strong>EUSAIR </strong>is the EU&#8217;s macro-regional strategy for the Adriatic-Ionian area. It brings together four EU Member States—<strong>Croatia, Greece, Italy and Slovenia</strong>—alongside <strong>San Marino</strong> and five EU candidate countries—<strong>Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia</strong>—to promote cooperation in areas including transport, energy, environmental sustainability and economic development.</p>
<p>As Tajani stated, the goal is to make the Adriatic-Ionian area <strong>&#8220;an increasingly dynamic driver of growth and a key economic, logistical and energy hub between Europe and the wider Mediterranean.&#8221;</strong></p>
<h4><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>Why connectivity is central to enlargement</strong></span></h4>
<p>One of the strongest messages of Tajani&#8217;s speech concerned infrastructure. He described European transport corridors as <strong>&#8220;tools for economic and political integration,&#8221;</strong> highlighting their role in improving trade flows, strengthening supply chains and bringing the Western Balkans closer to the European Union.</p>
<p>Among the projects mentioned was <strong>Corridor VIII</strong>, part of the <strong>Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T)</strong>, which connects the Adriatic Sea with the Black Sea through Albania, North Macedonia and Bulgaria. Tajani also highlighted the importance of <strong>Corridor X</strong>, another major European transport route linking Central Europe with Croatia, Serbia, North Macedonia and Greece. Together, these corridors are designed to facilitate the movement of people and goods while supporting regional economic integration.</p>
<p>Italy also reiterated its support for the proposed <strong>Trieste–Ljubljana–Zagreb–Belgrade railway</strong>, presented as part of its broader vision to strengthen regional connectivity, and for the<strong> India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)</strong>, the international connectivity initiative aimed at strengthening trade links between Europe, the Middle East and Asia. Within this framework, Tajani underlined the strategic role that <strong>Trieste and the Northern Adriatic port system</strong> could play as gateways connecting European and global markets.</p>
<h4><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>Enlargement remains a strategic priority</strong></span></h4>
<p>Later the same day, speaking before Parliament, Tajani reiterated Italy&#8217;s support for Ukraine&#8217;s future accession to the European Union while stressing that the Western Balkans should not lose momentum in the enlargement process.</p>
<p>He also identified <strong>Montenegro and Albania</strong> as the countries currently making the most advanced progress towards EU membership, reaffirming Italy&#8217;s commitment to supporting their accession path.</p>
<p>Whether 2026 ultimately becomes a turning point will depend on the pace of reforms in candidate countries and on the political will of EU Member States. For now, however, Italy has clearly placed enlargement back at the heart of its European agenda, supported by stronger regional cooperation, improved connectivity and long-term strategic investment.</p>
<h4><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>Sources</strong></span></h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Italy</strong>, <em>Ministers Tajani and Foti launch Italy&#8217;s Presidency of the EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region (EUSAIR)</em>, 28 July 2026.</li>
<li><strong>ANSA</strong>, <em>&#8220;Tajani: 2026 will be a decisive year for the strategy on the Balkans&#8221;</em>, 28 July 2026.</li>
</ul>
<p>L'articolo <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu/why-2026-could-be-a-decisive-year-for-eu-enlargement/">Why 2026 Could Be a Decisive Year for EU Enlargement</a> proviene da <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu">South East Europe Observatory</a>.</p>
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		<title>What does EU integration mean to Montenegro&#8217;s youth?</title>
		<link>https://www.seeobservatory.eu/what-does-eu-integration-mean-to-montenegros-youth/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[SEE Observatory]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 23 Jul 2026 14:16:30 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.seeobservatory.eu/?p=808</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In this contribution, Danijel Karađinović, MA in European Politics and Society (Podgorica, Montenegro), reflects on Montenegro&#8217;s European future, exploring the opportunities, responsibilities and challenges of EU integration from a young generation&#8217;s perspective. Importance of EU integration For my generation, European integration is no longer simply a foreign policy objective. It is a question of what [&#8230;]</p>
<p>L'articolo <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu/what-does-eu-integration-mean-to-montenegros-youth/">What does EU integration mean to Montenegro&#8217;s youth?</a> proviene da <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu">South East Europe Observatory</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In this contribution, <strong>Danijel Karađinović</strong>, MA in European Politics and Society (Podgorica, Montenegro), reflects on <strong>Montenegro&#8217;s European future</strong>, exploring the opportunities, responsibilities and challenges of EU integration from a young generation&#8217;s perspective.</p>
<h2 class="PDq2pG_selectionAnchorContainer" data-section-id="3glpna" data-start="267" data-end="302"><span style="font-size: 18px;" role="text"><strong data-start="270" data-end="302">Importance of EU integration</strong></span></h2>
<p data-start="304" data-end="933">For my generation, <strong data-start="323" data-end="347">European integration</strong> is no longer simply a foreign policy objective. It is a question of <strong data-start="416" data-end="439">what kind of future</strong> we want to live in. We are growing up in a world shaped by geopolitical instability, economic uncertainty, disinformation, and increasing political fragmentation. At a time when even the largest states struggle to face global challenges alone, I believe the answer cannot be <strong data-start="715" data-end="747">less Europe, but more Europe</strong>. Only through cooperation, solidarity, and deeper integration can European countries remain secure, competitive, and capable of protecting the democratic values on which they are built.</p>
<p data-start="935" data-end="1668">This is precisely why I see <strong data-start="963" data-end="986">Montenegro&#8217;s future</strong> exclusively within the European Union. I genuinely believe there is <strong data-start="1055" data-end="1082">no credible alternative</strong>. For Montenegrins, European integration represents far more than membership in an international organization. It means <strong data-start="1202" data-end="1238">stronger democratic institutions</strong>, an independent judiciary, greater economic and social security, and opportunities that a small country could hardly create on its own. My hope is that, in the next decade or two, Montenegro will become a <strong data-start="1444" data-end="1473">modern European democracy</strong> where institutions are stronger than individuals, where the law applies equally to everyone, and where young people feel they can build their future without having to leave their country behind.</p>
<h2 data-section-id="11ip13d" data-start="1670" data-end="1703"><span style="font-size: 18px;" role="text"><strong data-start="1673" data-end="1703">Future of Montenegro as MS</strong></span></h2>
<p data-start="1705" data-end="2380">At the same time, I think it is important to remain realistic. <strong data-start="1768" data-end="1809">EU membership is not a magic solution</strong> that will erase decades of political polarization, weak institutions, brain drain, or the spread of disinformation overnight. <strong data-start="1936" data-end="1966">Accession is the beginning</strong> of a much longer process rather than its conclusion. The responsibility to reform Montenegro will always remain primarily ours. Yet the European Union provides the framework, the expertise, and the partnership that make those reforms possible. With the support and experience of the other Member States, Montenegro will have the best opportunity to become a <strong data-start="2325" data-end="2379">stronger, more resilient modern democratic country</strong>.</p>
<p data-start="2382" data-end="3014">Of course, European integration also brings challenges. Previous enlargements have shown that <strong data-start="2476" data-end="2499">freedom of movement</strong> often encourages young people to seek opportunities abroad. Montenegro should expect this as well. However, I see this not as a reason to question accession, but as a reminder that <strong data-start="2681" data-end="2706">our work does not end</strong> when membership begins. Our political leaders must already be creating conditions that will encourage <strong data-start="2809" data-end="2844">talented young people to return</strong> by investing in quality jobs, competitive salaries, and strong public institutions, particularly in sectors facing severe shortages such as healthcare and the judiciary.</p>
<p data-start="3016" data-end="3721">When I think about the Europe my generation should build, I imagine a <strong data-start="3086" data-end="3136">politically stronger and more integrated Union</strong> that speaks with confidence, protects its democratic values, and offers every European country, regardless of its size, an equal place around the table. I hope that one day I will be able to tell future generations: <strong data-start="3353" data-end="3416">&#8220;we moved Europe forward; now it is your turn to continue.&#8221;</strong> I believe young people in Montenegro are ready for that responsibility. <strong data-start="3489" data-end="3575">We do not simply want to join the European Union. We want to help shape its future</strong> alongside our peers across the continent, building a Europe that is stronger, more united, and better prepared for the challenges that lie ahead.</p>
<p>L'articolo <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu/what-does-eu-integration-mean-to-montenegros-youth/">What does EU integration mean to Montenegro&#8217;s youth?</a> proviene da <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu">South East Europe Observatory</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Rome Charter: Italy&#8217;s renewed push for EU Enlargement in the Western Balkans</title>
		<link>https://www.seeobservatory.eu/the-rome-charter-italys-renewed-push-for-eu-enlargement-in-the-western-balkans/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[SEE Observatory]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 15:15:17 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.seeobservatory.eu/?p=804</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Italy is once again reaffirming its commitment to the European Union&#8217;s enlargement process in the Western Balkans. On 10 July, Villa Madama hosted the ministerial meeting of the Friends of the Western Balkans group, chaired by Italy&#8217;s Minister of Foreign Affairs Antonio Tajani and aimed at strengthening European support for the six Western Balkan countries [&#8230;]</p>
<p>L'articolo <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu/the-rome-charter-italys-renewed-push-for-eu-enlargement-in-the-western-balkans/">The Rome Charter: Italy&#8217;s renewed push for EU Enlargement in the Western Balkans</a> proviene da <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu">South East Europe Observatory</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Italy is once again reaffirming its commitment to the European Union&#8217;s enlargement process in the Western Balkans. On 10 July, Villa Madama hosted the ministerial meeting of the <strong>Friends of the Western Balkans</strong> group, chaired by Italy&#8217;s Minister of Foreign Affairs Antonio Tajani and aimed at strengthening European support for the six Western Balkan countries engaged in the EU accession process.</p>
<p>The meeting concluded with the adoption of the <strong>Rome Charter</strong>, a political document promoted by Italy that seeks to reaffirm a number of principles considered essential for the future of EU enlargement. The initiative comes at a time of renewed European attention towards the integration of the Western Balkans into the European Union.</p>
<p><strong><u>The Friends of the Western Balkans Group</u></strong></p>
<p>The group brings together seven EU Member States – Italy, Austria, Croatia, Greece, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia – committed to supporting the EU accession paths of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. Hungary also took part in the Rome meeting for the first time, having been invited in recognition of its commitment to supporting the integration of the Western Balkans.</p>
<p>The meeting took place just two months after the previous ministerial gathering in Bratislava, reflecting the participating countries&#8217; determination to keep the future of the Western Balkans and the EU enlargement process high on the European political agenda.</p>
<p>Alongside the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, representatives of international organisations and European institutions also attended, including the FAO Deputy Director-General, <strong>Maurizio Martina</strong>, the European Coordinator of the Western Balkans–Eastern Mediterranean Transport Corridor, <strong>Marian-Jean Marinescu</strong> and the InCE Secretary-General, <strong>Franco Dal Mas</strong>. Discussions focused not only on the EU accession process but also on strategic issues such as food security, supply chain resilience and strengthening regional connectivity.</p>
<p><strong><u>What Does the Rome Charter Propose?</u></strong></p>
<p>The main outcome of the meeting was the adoption of the <strong>Rome Charter</strong>, through which the participating countries call for preserving the <strong>credibility, predictability and unity of the enlargement process</strong>. The document reaffirms key principles for the future of enlargement, stressing the need to ensure that the accession process remains clear, coherent and firmly oriented towards the ultimate objective of EU membership.</p>
<p>Among its core principles is the reaffirmation of the full equality of Member States after accession. The Charter rejects models of <strong>&#8220;second-tier membership&#8221;</strong>, reaffirming that future members should enjoy the same rights and assume the same responsibilities as existing EU Member States.</p>
<p>The document also stresses the need to avoid introducing new conditionalities during the accession process. Any safeguard clauses or transitional measures, it states, should be based on objective, proportionate and temporary requirements, while taking into account the specific circumstances of each candidate country.</p>
<p><strong><u>Italy&#8217;s Role in the Enlargement Debate</u></strong></p>
<p>The initiative confirms Italy&#8217;s intention to play a leading role in the European debate on enlargement. In a message published on X following the meeting, Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani stressed the need to <strong>&#8220;give political priority to the reunification of the European family with the Balkans,&#8221;</strong> adding that <strong>&#8220;Italy intends to lead this process with a clear and determined strategic vision.&#8221;</strong> In the same message, he also highlighted the importance of strengthening transport infrastructure, energy networks and digital connectivity, referring to strategic projects such as IMEC and Corridor VIII while linking the enlargement process to broader issues including food security and Europe&#8217;s resilience.</p>
<p><strong><u>A Dynamic Phase for the Enlargement Process</u></strong></p>
<p>The Italian initiative comes at a particularly dynamic moment for EU enlargement. The adoption of the Rome Charter takes place just days before a new series of Intergovernmental Conferences scheduled in the framework of the EU General Affairs Council on 14 July.</p>
<p>On that occasion, the Irish Presidency aims to advance accession negotiations with Albania, Montenegro, Ukraine and Moldova. The objective is to continue closing additional negotiating chapters with Albania and Montenegro, while opening new negotiation clusters with Ukraine and Moldova. Serbia&#8217;s situation, however, remains different for the time being, as EU Member States have yet to reach consensus on opening the negotiating chapters currently under discussion.</p>
<p><strong><u>Looking Ahead</u></strong></p>
<p>The Rome Charter reaffirms a vision of the enlargement process based on principles shared by the participating countries: preserving the credibility of the accession process, ensuring clear rules, and guaranteeing that all future Member States join the European Union with equal rights and responsibilities.</p>
<p>At a time of significant geopolitical challenges, renewed support for the Western Balkans confirms that EU enlargement has returned to the centre of the European political debate. For the countries of the region, progress towards membership remains linked to meeting the accession criteria and implementing the required reforms. Within this context, the Rome Charter represents a political signal reaffirming the commitment of a group of EU Member States to an enlargement process that is credible, predictable and aimed at the full integration of the Western Balkans into the European Union.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>Sources</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale, <em>Al via la Riunione ministeriale del gruppo &#8220;Amici dei Balcani occidentali&#8221;</em> (10 luglio 2026) – <a href="https://www.esteri.it/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/comunicati/2026/07/al-via-la-riunione-ministeriale-del-gruppo-amici-dei-balcani-occidentali/">esteri.it</a></li>
<li>ANSA, <em>I Paesi del Gruppo Amici dei Balcani approvano la &#8220;Carta di Roma&#8221;</em> (11 luglio 2026) – <a href="https://www.ansa.it/nuova_europa/it/notizie/rubriche/altrenews/2026/07/10/i-paesi-del-gruppo-amici-dei-balcani-approvano-la-carta-di-roma_60d424f9-86b5-465f-b9c3-0a3f02be3181.html">ansa.it</a></li>
<li>Antonio Tajani, <em>Post su X relativo alla riunione del Gruppo &#8220;Amici dei Balcani occidentali&#8221;</em> (10 luglio 2026) &#8211; <a href="https://x.com/Antonio_Tajani/status/2075558525108109771">com/Antonio_Tajani</a></li>
<li>Andrea Carli, <em>Balcani occidentali nella Ue, vertice a Roma. Italia in pressing</em>, <em>Il Sole 24 Ore</em> (10 luglio 2026) &#8211; <a href="http://www.ilsole24ore.com">ilsole24ore.com</a></li>
</ul>
<p>L'articolo <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu/the-rome-charter-italys-renewed-push-for-eu-enlargement-in-the-western-balkans/">The Rome Charter: Italy&#8217;s renewed push for EU Enlargement in the Western Balkans</a> proviene da <a href="https://www.seeobservatory.eu">South East Europe Observatory</a>.</p>
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